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Abstract 
 
This interview with the philosopher Bernard Stiegler was conducted in Paris 
on 28 January 2015, and first appeared in Dutch translation in the journal De 
uil van Minerva. The conversation begins by discussing the fundamental place 
occupied by the concept of ‘technics’ in Stiegler’s work, and how the 
‘constitutivity’ of technics does and does not relate to Kant and Husserl. 
Stiegler is then asked about his relationship with Deleuze, and he responds 
by focusing on the concept of quasi-causality, but also by arguing that there 
is a certain trajectory in Deleuze’s thought, situating his own philosophy in 
relation to its various moments. Stiegler is then asked to respond to the 
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks carried out three weeks prior to the 
interview. After making a couple of precautionary remarks, Stiegler relates 
such occurrences to the problem of what he calls ‘spiritual poverty’, to the 
intensification of ‘negative sublimation’ that can occur when there is a 
disconnection between the generations, and more generally to the growth of 
nihilism. All of these phenomena relate to the exploitation of technology by 
a virulent capitalism that irrationally believes that only the market is rational. 
After consideration of the complex historical relationship between Islam 
and modernization, and of both of these to Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’, and 
after recalling the destructive role played by the West in the rise of 
fundamentalism and jihadism, Stiegler concludes by reflecting on the fact 
that, ultimately, ‘intellectuals’ have failed to use technologies in ways that 
produce alternatives to consumerism. 
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Introduction 
 
The French philosopher Bernard Stiegler published the first volume of his 
series, Technics and Time, in 1994. The preface opens with two claims: that 
‘technics’ is the horizon of all future to come, and that it is what philosophy 
has repressed throughout its history. The centrality of this term to Stiegler’s 
thought is thus established from the outset, in a way that resonates (in 
departing from it) with Heidegger’s claim that what philosophy has never 
thought is being itself. From this centrality of technics, however, it would be 
imprudent to conclude that Stiegler’s work belongs to the category 
‘philosophy of technology’, still less that he is some kind of technological 
‘determinist’. For Stiegler, ‘hominization’ can never be separated from 
‘technicization’, the who and the what co-emerging in a relation of 
undecidable priority from what he refers to as an ‘originary default’ (1998: 
121–2). 
 If this last concept has about it something of a Derridian ring, then 
this is no accident: Stiegler’s work enacts a kind of genealogy of différance 
even if it is simultaneously a profound critique (Ross, 2013). This 
connection between the two philosophies is only strengthened when, a 
dozen years later, Stiegler places Derrida’s reading of the Phaedrus at the 
centre of all his subsequent diagnoses and analyses of the evolving 
relationship between technology and capitalism. As Derrida emphasized, for 
Socrates the pharmakon referred to the technics of writing as bearing the dual 
characteristics of being an aid and a threat to memory. For the last decade, 
Stiegler has pursued a ‘pharmacological’ approach that extends the reading 
of the pharmakon to every artefact. The fundamental philosophico-political 
concept utilized in that approach has been ‘proletarianization’: whether it is 
the inscription of speech in writing, the inscription of the gestures of the 
hand in the machines of the industrial revolution, or the inscription of the 
sensible in the audiovisual technologies of consumerist capitalism, all of 
these represent pharmacological stages that each time inaugurate a new 
tendency towards the loss of knowledge. In the latter case, it is the industrial 
exploitation of this tendency that forms the heart of consumer capitalism. 
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 What this also shows, however, is that Stiegler is very concerned with 
processes of becoming, which draws his thinking away from Derrida and 
back towards Heidegger and Simondon, but also towards Deleuze. Stiegler, 
we might say, gives a Deleuzian inflection to the Derridian distinction 
between devenir and avenir, but this also implies a confrontation with 
Deleuze’s philosophy and with his politics: one of the great virtues of this 
interview is the opportunity it provides for Stiegler to clarify the manner in 
which he interprets this question via the concept of ‘quasi-causality’, which 
for Stiegler is always the quasi-causality of the pharmakon itself. 
 Another consequence of the quasi-Deleuzian tendency of Stiegler’s 
recent thought is the confrontation with the question of nihilism, and of its 
relationship with capitalism. This concern is not new in Stiegler’s thought 
(see Stiegler, 2011a), but Stiegler argues, in his reading of what Berns and 
Rouvroy (2013) have called (drawing on Foucault and Deleuze) ‘algorithimic 
governmentality’, that digitalization and high performance computing have 
accelerated the growth of this desert (Stiegler, 2016). Beyond Berns and 
Rouvroy, Stiegler emphasizes that what is at stake with this great 
computational acceleration is not just control, or surveillance, or 
rationalization: it is how these lead to the growth of unreason and stupidity 
(and in terms of the latter, too, Stiegler argues for Deleuze against Derrida – 
see Stiegler, 2015). Stiegler’s technological analyses are therefore always also 
‘symptomatological’ analyses (in the sense developed in Vignola, 2016): 
hence this unreason is a question not just of stupidity but of madness, which 
is also to say, of terror, and on all sides. In this interview, Stiegler begins to 
draw these threads together, in what perhaps amounts to the emergence of a 
new tendency in his thinking, in which what will be at stake, even if it is not 
here named, is disruption as such. The question of the future, today, is the 
question of the quasi-causal production of alternatives to this profoundly 
nihilistic situation. 
This interview with Bernard Stiegler was conducted by Judith 
Wambacq and Bart Buseyne on 28 January 2015, at the Institut de 
Recherche et d’Innovation in Paris. The text first appeared in Dutch 
translation in the philosophy journal De uil van Minerva. Tijdschrift voor 
geschiedenis en wijsbegeerte van de cultuur 28 (4) (2015). The interviewers would 
like to thank Sofie Messeman for her technical assistance and editorial 
advice. 
 
 
 4 
General organology 
 
UM: Bernard Stiegler, you are the author of some thirty books, including the 
three volumes of Technics and Time (1998; 2009b; 2011b). This series is often 
considered your magnum opus. It is not surprising, then, that many people see 
you as a ‘philosopher of technics’ rather than of politics or science. 
Nevertheless, this description is a bit misleading. The question of technics, 
as you pose it, is not just a regional issue. Might we say about technics what 
Jean Laplanche said about sexuality in the psychoanalytic field 1 : if not 
everything, technics is nevertheless present throughout the human field; it is 
coextensive with existence? 
 
BS: I completely agree with this way of presenting things. And it is all the 
more interesting to me because the question of the status of sexuality in 
psychoanalysis is a subject of great importance to me, and one that I think 
must, precisely, be articulated with technics. 
For fifteen years now, I have developed a proposition, both 
theoretical and practical, in terms of what I call a ‘general organology’. Many 
people understand general organology as the submission of everything to 
technics, which would thus be the object of this general organology. 
Currently I am trying to show that organology does not refer only to 
technics, but also and equally to organs and organizations. The noetic 
organs, those of the ‘noetic soul’, are not simply technical, and neither are 
organizations. But every noetic organ and every noetic organization is also 
technical – and organological in this sense, which means: not only organic, 
not only organizational. 
Organology is a theory and a practice of the organization that 
encompasses all kinds of non-technical realities. This theory, although 
‘general’, does not claim to absorb all theories. But all theories are 
concerned by it, and I have the weakness to believe that it concerns them all 
– because it is a discourse on the conditions of possibility and on the limits 
of theories, which is also to say, on the necessity of practice. 
Rather than as a theory, and even though it is also ‘theoretical’, I 
present it as an approach – not even a method – as a way not only of posing 
questions, but of letting oneself be put into question (by technics, organs and 
organizations, combined and forming transductive relations) in order to 
confront what Deleuze called problems. This approach consists in saying: as 
soon as we investigate a dimension of humanity – economic, hermeneutic, 
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aesthetic, psychoanalytic and so on – we always discover technics 
somewhere. Technics contaminates the other dimensions of general 
organology. 
If, for example, we wish to study the brain, the eye or the human 
finger, we can never do so without taking account of what accompanies this 
brain, this eye or this finger. The finger holds objects that are technical, and 
that it may itself have fabricated. The way it holds these objects is inscribed 
in a social organization that is neither technical nor biological, and that 
conditions it. Technics is therefore everywhere, yet nothing is ever reducible 
to technics. This is why I locate myself very well within the proposition by 
Laplanche (with which I am also in profound agreement with respect to 
psychoanalysis) and in the analogy that you draw. 
 
 
The constitutivity of technics 
 
UM: Technics is not simply any device or system we encounter in the world. 
Before being an object present to consciousness, technics constitutes this 
consciousness as such. How do you understand this word, ‘constitution’? Is 
it a reference to Kant, who made a distinction between the constitutive and 
the regulative?2 
 
BS: The question of the relationship between the regulative and the 
constitutive is obviously immense – and forms the issue of the Kantian 
heritage and the ‘system of idealism’ between Schelling and Fichte. What I 
call consistences, which do not exist, as they overflow existence and in so 
doing project it beyond subsistence, are a way of reprising the concept of 
the regulative idea in Kant that I have placed at the heart of what I call the 
idiotext, and that I articulate with the phenomenological question of 
protention and with the Freudian question of desire. The regulative idea 
opens for philosophy a completely new and promising possibility. But to 
fully assume this, we must transform the status of the constitutive in Kant. I 
have tried to show in the third volume of Technics and Time (2011b) that the 
schematism in the first version of the Critique of Pure Reason is made possible 
by a fourth synthesis, a techno-logical synthesis, which is obviously totally 
incompatible with Kant. 
The regulative idea (like the schematism) is conditioned by this fourth 
synthesis. This statement needs to be developed at a length beyond what I 
 6 
can do here: I would like to think about it further. I do not want to make 
premature statements. 
Technical constitutivity is not transcendental because that which is 
constituted can in fact become constituting – as well as destituting: this 
pharmacology is a philosophy of becoming and of its ‘différance’ such that, 
within this becoming, it opens a future (that is, a law or right), so that this 
constitutivity or condition of possibility is also a destitutive condition of 
impossibility (where the law can always regress into a new state of fact). 
That which constitutes – technics – destitutes. Technics is at once 
and in the same gesture that which constitutes possibility and that which 
bars possibility. As such, it is what imposes upon us politics, ethics, 
aesthetics, religion – in short, everything that forms care, Sorge, therapeia. If, 
therefore, there is indeed constitutivity, it is not a transcendental 
constitutivity: it is also destitutive. It is an a-transcendental constitutivity. 
Technics still has the function that the transcendental had in Kant and 
Husserl – constitutivity – but it is no longer transcendental: it is originally 
empirical (and accidental). Nor is this ‘a-transcendental empiricism’, so to 
speak, Deleuzian. Deleuze and Guattari were never able to think the 
question of the artefact. In this respect, an entire segment of their thought 
remains on the side of Platonism. 
 
 
The quasi-causality of Deleuze 
 
UM: But with this idea of a paradoxical condition that is immanent and not 
transcendent, are you not very close to Deleuze? 
 
BS: You are right – I am even becoming closer to Deleuze. And yet, I find a 
fundamental blockage in Deleuze, less in Guattari – but in him I find other 
problems. Guattari is perhaps more open, however, to this introduction of 
the organological into life. Deleuze is Bergsonian, and his Bergsonism is on 
this plane intractable. 
What matters most to me in Deleuze is his idea of quasi-causality 
(1990; Stiegler, 2013a). It is a position with respect to life that consists in 
positing that what wounds me, what weakens me – if it does not kill me – is 
also my chance. My chance lies only there; it is not providence – 
transcendental or transcendent – that will save us. There is no salvation, and 
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it is not a question of being saved, but of being worthy. This is what is 
magnificent in Deleuze. 
In fact, it is always a question of being worthy of technics – that is, of 
the accidental – including when it leaves me destitute. To be worthy of the 
strength that it gives me is pretty easy. But to be worthy of what it takes 
away from me is a true test. How this diminishing of myself can be 
transformed into an increase of me, this time no longer as myself but as me-
the-other. This Deleuze is the Deleuze who interests me. 
 
UM: So dignity has nothing to do with passivity, acceptance or resignation, 
but is on the contrary about action? 
 
BS: Indeed, this is why it is not at all a Gelassenheit: this has to do with 
individuation and transformation, with what after Simondon I call 
‘invention’. Deleuze opens up a ‘pharmacological’ perspective in Difference 
and Repetition, where he refers to repetition as ‘what we die from’ and as what 
‘saves and heals’ – repetition as pharmakon.3 Subsequently, with Guattari, he 
will engage with all kinds of things that are no longer strictly Deleuzian and 
that go very far. And I believe that, by 1990, he realizes that he has gone a 
little too far: I believe that in the interview with Toni Negri on control 
societies, he becomes critical of what he and Guattari had opened up in 
Anti-Oedipus, A Thousand Plateaus and many other texts (Deleuze, 1995). I 
think he begins to take a little step back. He has aged, and he perhaps finds 
a little limited this kind of yes to the capitalist ‘desiring machine’, which had 
become more and more an attitude and less and less a thought. 
I believe that he felt coming like none before him the first effects of 
ultra-liberalism. Deleuze is a political thinker. For the first time, he began to 
assert the negative, in a way. Starting from 1990, at the moment when he 
takes up the theme of the dividual that I believe comes from Guattari, he 
finds it hard to say yes and it is as if he feels coming what will be shown by 
Thomas Berns and Antoinette Rouvroy, namely, that the concepts of 
Deleuze and Guattari function perfectly well in and as what they call 
‘algorithmic governmentality’ (Berns and Rouvroy, 2013), but that in so 
doing, they function in a way that is contrary to what Deleuze and Guattari 
expected (I myself comment in detail on Berns and Rouvroy’s commentary 
in Automatic Society [2016]). 
This moment is, however, also the beginning of a wrong turn in 
Deleuze. He is no longer Deleuzian enough for my taste when he begins to 
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talk about resistance. Now, it is precisely when he begins to say, ‘there, there 
is the negative’, that we should not resist, but invent. To be worthy is not to 
be passive or resistant (that is, ‘reactive’ in the sense so often convoked by 
Deleuze), but to be inventive: it is to propose a new agencement, as Deleuze 
and Guattari say, which must be organological, that is, enabled by technical 
invention itself, and as the reality of repetition, from which we die and 
which saves. 
What interests me is a kind of triangle between transcendental 
philosophy (Kant, Husserl, Heidegger’s existential analytic), the Derridian 
approach and Deleuzian quasi-causality. I try to create a thought for the 
twenty-first century with these three dimensions – plus psychoanalysis. 
 
 
Spiritual poverty 
 
UM: We would like to ask you some questions about recent events, 
including the terrorist attacks in Paris on 7 January 2015, and more generally 
on the acts of violence committed by Muslim fundamentalism around the 
world. Do you think that the attacks justified by reference to Islam can be 
understood as a critique vis-à-vis the ‘lifestyle’ propagated by neoliberal 
capitalism? Fundamentalists critique, for example, the materialism of 
Western culture, the absence of spiritual and family values, and so on. Can 
this criticism be understood as a critique of the lack of responsibility and 
care in the West? 
 
BS: Before I give you my reply, I would like to make two remarks. Firstly, 
until now I have refused to be interviewed on this subject. Within the Ars 
Industrialis4 group, several people wanted, in the hours after the attacks, to 
open discussions. I opposed this. It was the first time I took such an 
authoritarian decision as president of Ars Industrialis. I argued in essence that 
even though I wanted messages to be circulated in order to make our 
positions known to each other, and of course that we express ourselves 
publicly as individuals, as a group I did not want us to take a position. 
What occurred is of extraordinary gravity and it is absolutely 
fundamental to take the time to reflect. The media-terrorist system is created 
to produce emotion that prevents thinking (which is similar to what some 
call ‘functional stupidity’ [Alvesson and Spicer, 2012]). Responding to you 
will be the first time I have spoken on this subject – with, I hope, much 
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precaution, and in my own name. And I may say little apart from a few 
generalities that will rather be reminders. 
Second remark: I do not believe that the attacks in Paris were 
committed by Muslim fundamentalists. When we refer to jihadists, the vast 
majority if not all of the cases are very recent converts who, moreover, are 
not always North African or African. Twenty-five per cent of jihadists in 
France are French of European origin. Some are not even from ghettoized 
banlieues, but from so-called ‘la France désertée’, the devastated small towns 
where there is nothing to do, including Normandy and the coast of Brittany, 
such as the former seaman who is more than fifty and whose trial has just 
begun. These jihadists are not in general Muslims: they claim a phantasmatic 
adherence to Islam, but they have had no religious education. It is a kind of 
claiming of spiritual identity, sudden, exalted and extreme, that in general 
changes very quickly into ultra-violent processes that have nothing religious 
about them. This is not to say that there are no Muslims among these 
jihadists, but they are the exceptions. Nor is it to say that there are no 
groups in Muslim countries manipulating them. 
Having made these two remarks, I am not saying there is no issue 
with Islam. But this is another question, even if we perhaps cannot 
completely separate these two issues. The issue with Islam is also an issue 
with fundamentalism in general, that is, with Jewish Israeli fundamentalism 
and with American evangelical fundamentalism, which may also be an 
Occidentalist fundamentalism (Catholic fundamentalism, in France, seems 
less vital, and Pope Francis seems to open a new epoch). The singularity of 
the conditions in which the question of fundamentalism arises, today, in all 
its many and varied forms (including secular fundamentalism), lies in what I 
have called ‘spiritual poverty’ (Stiegler, 2013b). 
Since Aimer, s’aimer, nous aimer (‘To Love, to Love Me, to Love Us: 
From September 11 to April 21’, in Stiegler, 2009a), I have tried to analyse 
the various forms of noetic poverty – symbolic, affective, intellectual, 
spiritual, sexual, in brief: the misery and poverty that is based on the loss of 
the feeling of existing. When I published this book on Richard Durn, who 
was not a terrorist but a mass murderer, and who several weeks before the 
massacre professed his need to kill, I finished this analysis by saying: there 
are millions of Durns, and in the right conditions they will undertake the 
passage to the act. The behaviour of Durn, of those who committed the 
attacks in Madrid, of Anders Breivik in Norway, is above all criminal 
behaviour conducted by people who have become mad from the feeling of 
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not existing. [And since this interview, at this moment when I am re-reading 
and correcting the text, we have seen the pilot who drove an airliner into a 
mountain for no other reason than to take hundreds of lives in what is 
described as his suicide – but can such a description be sufficient?] 
 
 
Negative sublimation 
 
BS: Furthermore, this problem arises in a highly specific way in youth. 
Yesterday morning, there was a program on France Culture radio featuring a 
sociologist who had just published a book on the state of French youth. He 
spoke about a rate of suicide never reached before, and of a terrible 
widespread despair. A youth without professional future, even when it is 
over-qualified. No process of identification, not to its parents, not to any 
heroes, not to anything whatsoever. What can this end up producing, 
especially at the end of adolescence? It can produce what I call ‘negative 
sublimation’ (Stiegler, 2013b: 48). Negative sublimation always appears in 
adolescence, where there is always a negative moment, a moment of 
transgression, whether directed towards oneself (self-harm), or against 
conventions (growing long hair and so on), or at relatives (slamming the 
door, running away). To become adult is firstly to break away from norms – 
all this is banal. Anti-conformism is the very soft version of something that 
can nevertheless go further, and sometimes very far, for example, up to 
killing one’s father. 
In normal adolescent development, this anti-conformism leads to the 
adolescent, faced with adults, presenting himself as being ethically more correct. 
He becomes the righter of wrongs. He turns to his father and asks him: 
‘What did you yourself do during the war? Were you in the resistance? No, 
you were a collaborator. You were just like everyone else. You were just a 
sheep.’ 
There is always a moment when the adolescent begins to become this 
righter of wrongs, and thus to become adult, because he is in the course of 
figuring out what could be the position of an adult as the one who 
prescribes or will prescribe – for example, to his own children. If this 
righting of wrongs is not done through processes of positive identification 
to a figure alternative to the parents, this can only create complications. 
Today, there is no figure with whom adolescence can positively 
identify. Who could identify with François Hollande? There remains the 
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Syrians, who are massacred by Assad and who are not sufficiently helped – 
and who the media sometimes present as resistors to the Assad regime, and 
as its victims, sometimes as Islamic State, as the devil, something 
systematically cultivated by this ‘state’: it is indeed quite diabolical. By doing 
this, you create an incomprehensible scene of negative identification, if I can 
put it like this, for a generation which has no experience, no religious 
education, no political education, if any education at all. 
 
 
Disintegration 
 
UM: Why do you say it has no education? Didn’t it go to school? 
 
BS: Three weeks before the attacks in Paris, I gave a lecture entitled ‘La 
désintégration’, in the theatre of the famous northern quartier of Marseilles 
(Stiegler, 2014).5 These are the poorest neighbourhoods in France: very high 
unemployment, violence, drugs and so on. My lecture was addressed to the 
population, including National Front voters, because I am convinced that, 
firstly, it serves no purpose to insult those who vote for the National Front, 
and furthermore, it is not the right thing to do politically. We need to offer 
political proposals instead of insults. I had decided not to speak about the 
National Front, nor about the violence in this quartier, but to take things 
from a more distanced perspective. So I spoke, among other things – but 
especially – about education. 
Today, education is not working. Education, in the sense of public 
instruction, was conceived by Jules Ferry to satisfy two things. 
Firstly, broadly speaking, it was a matter of fulfilling the program of 
Condorcet, that is, of establishing citizenship on the basis of a relative 
rationality of the behaviour of the citizen, and of acquiring this rationality 
through a frequentation of rational culture (mathematics, the sciences, as 
well as history, geography and literature subjected to critique, and so on). 
Secondly, it was a matter of generating the feeling of belonging to the 
nation. You know the famous statement by Jules Ferry: ‘one is not born 
French, one becomes French’. This means that we can accommodate 
anyone in France, which guarantees that one who is not born French can 
become so. How does one become French? One does so, among other 
things, at school. School is a machine to produce individuation. But for this 
to work, it is necessary to have identification. And not only that: for there to 
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be identification, there needs to be idealization and sublimation. I myself am 
individuated as French even though I have German origins. My name is 
Stiegler; my maternal grandfather was called Trautmann. So I am not so 
French, but I identified myself with the Sans-culottes – that my ancestors 
may well have fought. As a child, I identified with all the characters of 
French history: Louis XIV, Robespierre, Napoleon. I am not at all a 
nationalist, but I am proud to be French. I love this history. I know it and I 
claim it. I say this because today this is no longer the case at all. These 
processes of identification no longer function. 
 
 
Transindividuation through language 
 
BS: One day, in a lecture, I referred to a Flemish mayor6 who became well-
known because of his refusal to provide housing to people who could not 
speak Dutch. All the French newspapers, especially on the left, denounced 
this decision. As for myself, I tried to understand his position – which I 
believe first of all reflects the fact that we live in a society in which what I 
have called the process of the individuation of reference has disappeared 
(Stiegler, 2008: 112). 
In the Middle Ages, in France, there were all kinds of local social 
groups constituted as such, in Brittany, Occitania, Provence, Savoie and so 
on. They are, generally speaking, counties or duchies that are more or less at 
war. There is no national unity. The process of collective individuation 
occurs at different levels – between feudalisms and divine law, the language 
of which is Latin and the body of which are the clerics. 
A society is always constituted by collective individuation phenomena 
that are stratified at different levels, and which need a plane of reference 
allowing the handling of disputes – in the Middle Ages this was, in France, 
divine justice, until the end of the Ancien Régime. After the French 
Revolution, it was political justice – the nation – that was imposed, including 
through a language, French, which comes eventually to destroy all other 
languages. 
The Flemish mayor was reacting to the fact that the market has 
destroyed every process of the individuation of reference. The 
transindividuation of reference is a plane of sublimation and idealization. It 
is not on the same plane as that which, as commodity, is exhausted in its 
consumption. The life of Jesus, the exemplarity of heroes, the nation: these 
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are objects of sublimation and idealization that allow constructions – they 
are ‘necessary fictions’ – that make possible the transmission of knowledge. 
They constitute what Pierre Legendre calls ‘the dogmatics of knowledge’, 
the indisputable (1999; 2006). For example, we all speak French, we all 
believe in God, we all fight for the freedom of French territory even if we 
speak Breton, and so on. Today, this plane that no longer exists has been 
replaced by the transindividuation of marketing (Stiegler, 2008: 107ff.) – and 
the Flemish mayor would like to rediscover transindividuation through 
language. 
 
 
Nihilism 
 
BS: Capitalism has systematically pursued the capturing and harnessing of all 
the dynamics of individuation and transindividuation, and has thereby 
destroyed the transindividuation of reference, engendering frustration and 
the exhaustion of transindividuation. Brand identification, piercing, this or 
that ‘practice’ prompted by the market sooner or later reveals its 
vacuousness, and leads to de-identification and disappointment: to the 
experience of what Nietzsche called nihilism – where the person who 
experiences it discovers himself or herself to be nihil. To be nothing is to 
lose the feeling of existing. This is what happened to Richard Durn. It is 
also the case for all kinds of other suicidal murderers [from 11 September 
2001 to 24 March 2015, from Mohamed Atta to Andreas Lubitz, passing 
through Durn, the Kouachi brothers and many others]. 
An adolescent of 13 to 14 years, in any high school in France, and not 
only in the poorest neighbourhoods, less and less sees his or her teacher as a 
figure of ideality. Take the example of a biology teacher (in France, a teacher 
of the life and earth sciences). Current knowledge in biology raises huge 
questions. But nothing that is taught in today’s programs enables teachers to 
address these questions: current knowledge in biology puts in question 
everything that is taught in these programs. The teachers who teach biology 
in high school have received a classical education in molecular biology, 
which, in addition to being in debate today, led to biotechnologies for which 
there is no satisfactory theory and which in some way empty of its meaning 
the statement that François Jacob, in The Logic of Life, placed at the heart of 
neo-Darwinism, namely, that ‘the [genetic] program cannot receive lessons 
from experience’ (1973: 3, translation modified). 
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Today, technology directs all scientific activity, qua what is referred to 
as ‘technoscience’ – where science has become a machine for producing 
innovation, that is, efficiency, and not truth. I say, indeed, ‘producing truth’, 
since I believe that this is the role of reason – as one produces evidence in a 
trial and where truth has a performative dimension. Science in the service of 
innovation no longer produces theorems but efficiencies, or rather, efficient 
causes that ‘work’, that is, that function – as a function of a whole from 
which the question has been eliminated: this science is purely analytical; it 
flees the synthetic questions that constitute the ideas of reason and what 
Whitehead called the function of reason (1929). But we do not know how 
and how long these efficient causalities can ‘work’. For example, we do not 
know how to explain in a satisfactory theoretical way what a genetically 
modified organism is within the whole of life. There is no agreement about 
this within the scientific community. Teachers who have to discuss this with 
their students – who hear it discussed constantly in the media, including 
through the issue of surrogate motherhood – are de-legitimated, and they do 
not feel legitimate because they have not been trained in these issues that do 
not yet form a knowledge – but rather a non-knowledge. They do not teach 
prevailing knowledge, they therefore no longer embody any ideality, and 
hence there does not occur any process of identification or of sublimation: 
what results is a rejection, the painful awareness of which is increasing, on 
the part of students, and that, combined with the absence of economic 
future and the prospect (for some, inevitable) of unemployment, can lead 
only to despair. 
If now these students are approached by Wahhabi Islamist militants, 
financed by the King of Saudi Arabia, who has put a lot of money into the 
French banlieues, teaching them an extremely radical and anti-modernist 
version of Islam – Wahhabism – they identify with this ideology, and do so 
all the more easily that the Saudi royal family is courted by the entire West, 
beginning with François Hollande. 
How can young people who lack figures with whom to identify not 
lose their bearings in such a situation? Any populist – whether they are a far-
right populist or a jihadist – can channel negative sublimation in their 
direction. A youthful psychic apparatus cannot become adult without 
sublimation. If he does not find it in his father, or in his teacher, or in his 
priest, or in his football coach, he will look for it where he can find it. And 
lures can be found among all those who exploit the misery and poverty of 
the world: the far right, jihadism, fundamentalisms, but also marketing, drug 
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traffickers and so on. Now, these lures are all the more effective in that 
sublimation is always founded on the lure of a necessary fiction. 
 
 
The question of Islam 
 
BS: In Islam, the sublimation of sexuality is very different from sublimation 
in Jewish and Christian monotheism. Jewish and Christian monotheisms 
have themselves been transformed by Islam. Islam accomplished the 
modernization of monotheism well before the Jews and Christians. At that 
time, Islam was not just a religion, it was an extremely important military, 
economic and political power that structured almost all of southern Europe. 
Despite its divisions, the Islamic empire was, along with China, the most 
prosperous region in the world. And then there occurred a slow decline of 
Ottoman power, due to a reversal of the situation that, starting in the 
fifteenth century and passing through the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation, led to colonialism and capitalism, and to the West prevailing 
over Islam. Through many major conflicts and transformations of 
Christianity, modernization shifted to Judeo-Christianity (the worst of these 
conflicts being anti-Semitism). 
This modernization of Judeo-Christianity – operating through 
capitalism in the sense of Max Weber (1992) – will lead to secularization, 
that will in turn result in the progressive de-sacralization of a number of 
prohibitions, in particular those related to sexuality and diet (including 
through the marriage of pastors in the Reformed Church). Islam did not go 
through this experience. Since the fifteenth or sixteenth century, Islam has 
erected borders to protect itself from the destruction of its civilization by 
the modernity of the Judeo-Christians, whom we should never forget were 
firstly conquerors, warriors and murderous, just as Islam was at its origin. 
Judaism, on the contrary, did integrate into Christian Europe, but at the cost 
of regular massacres, the last and the worst of which was Auschwitz. 
Judaism has often been at the forefront of the secularization brought by 
capitalism – and a great many leading scientists of Europe were Jews. Freud 
is in this an exemplary figure. The most emancipated of the Europeans in 
the era of Freud is Freud, and he is a Jew. He was not a believer, but he 
claimed the Mosaic culture. 
In all this there remains something unresolved, something even 
deeply repressed, including in French philosophy, notably in what French 
 16 
philosophy has to say (or fails to say) about the divine, the religious and the 
sacred. The few texts that touch upon the question of religious belief in the 
world, on the status of God in Western history and on the so-called ‘return 
of the religious’ are often lamentable. Yet until recently God was the 
question of philosophy. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, one 
cannot be a philosopher if one does not respond to the question of God. It 
is a necessary question even if one is an atheist. It is the question that has 
constituted philosophy since Plato, as borne out by Aristotle. Now, what 
does one have to say, today, on the question of God and of the death of God, 
beyond what we know from Weber and Freud, and since our experience of 
the destruction of the transindividuation of reference by marketing, which 
neither Freud nor Weber were able to understand? 
 
 
The apocalypse 
 
BS: If we have to live through what Nietzsche called ‘the fulfilment of 
nihilism’ that is, so to speak, the concretization of the ‘death of God’, then 
we must pose the question of God – which is obviously not the same as 
resurrecting Him. Today, we live the ordeal of nihilism; today, nihilism 
presents itself as such, that is, in the form of the experience that I am 
nothing. 
For a long time it did not present itself as this nothing. It presented 
itself as ‘anything goes’, ‘I can do it all’, ‘I can transgress’. When nihilism 
presents itself as such, can I recognize it? What is it that I am living? What is 
my experience? It is the experience of what Kierkegaard already described as 
despair (1980). When despair becomes the most common experience, the 
most widespread, it is no longer possible to ignore the specific questions 
raised by the death of God, the questions, dare I say, worthy of the death of 
God. We are in the course of living through what we could call, in religious 
language, the ‘apocalypse’ of nihilism. It is here that we must become 
worthy of the ordeal of nihilism. By suggesting that he himself arrives too 
soon with this statement, Nietzsche in some way says to us: ‘I await the 
moment when you will truly encounter nihilism. Now I am speaking to you 
and you believe you understand me. But in fact you do not understand me 
at all. You believe you understand, but you do not understand because if you 
understood, you would be living through your apocalypse.’ Now, we are in 
the course of living our apocalypse. And it is now that the question arises of 
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our capacity to become the quasi-cause of nothing, of nihil. We must ‘assume’ the 
pharmacological extremification of this situation. And what interests me in 
this situation is firstly its visibly and irreducibly organological tenor, where it 
clearly becomes necessary to ask about the organological conditions that 
have made all this possible, and about the irreducibly pharmacological 
character of these conditions – which is a new way of encountering finitude 
and the infinite. 
 
 
Ordeals of nihilism 
 
UM: And do you believe that everyone is included in this absolute nihilism? 
The Chinese, too, for example? Is it throughout the whole world that there 
is this experience of nihilism? 
 
BS: This is a difficult and fundamental question. Yes, I think that 
throughout the world there is this experience, but that it is experienced in 
very different ways. So, also in China. The reason I say this is that the 
Chinese recognize themselves in my books – quite a few of which are 
already translated into Chinese. 
 
UM: It is not in terms of exoticism that they are interested? 
 
BS: No, I don’t think so. In 2006, fifteen per cent of Chinese people were 
already thought to be depressed. Given the speed of the destabilization of 
social bodies through the adoption of the Western way of life, I believe that 
this figure will increase significantly. This does not mean that the same thing 
will be experienced everywhere in the same way. 
In the shantytowns of Rabat, I saw in the late 1980s how people 
watch French programs like Champs Elysées, a popular and extremely vulgar 
show that presented a completely false image of France. Morocco’s poor 
thus lived nihilism via French television broadcasts. Technology exports 
processes, the main one of which is the liquidation of processes of the 
transindividuation of reference, which is the major, concrete reality of 
nihilism – in return provoking ‘reactivity’ in the Nietzschean sense, 
ressentiment, regression. The process of annihilation can be accomplished in 
anti-nihilistic ways, through reactions against nihilism that are obviously, in 
fact, expressions of nihilism (for example, fundamentalism). This is what 
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Paolo Vignola analyses through his symptomatology (2013; 2014). For 
myself, fundamentalism is a reaction of nihilism to nihilism, an expression of 
nihilism, and not a ‘return of the religious’. 
 
 
Inversions of causality 
 
UM: So do you identify the cause with technology rather than with 
consumerism, for example? 
 
BS: No, I would not say that. When there are events as tragic and serious as 
the attacks of 7 January, they produce, as a general rule, inversions of 
causality where the effect becomes the cause and the cause becomes the 
effect. I have tried to show this in Pharmacologie du Front national (2013a): 
those who vote for the National Front in fact suffer negative causes, but 
transform these causes into effects and these effects into causes – they make 
immigrants the cause of their suffering even though immigrants also suffer, 
and often more so, from the same causal factors. These inversions 
constitute a fundamental feature of pharmacology: when the pharmakon 
reveals its toxicity, we look for a pharmakos, a scapegoat, rather than 
collectively change our relation to the pharmakon, which can only be done 
collectively and which those who exploit the toxic effects of the pharmakon 
systematically try to prevent. In the case of jihadism, similar processes occur. 
It is not technology that produces inversions of causality. It is the fact 
that technology is exploited by a capitalism that has become extremely 
virulent, violent and totally irresponsible, and that brings massive 
destruction to social structures as well as mental structures and natural 
environments. The destruction of social structures is not a secondary 
consequence: it is a goal. Capitalism wants to destroy family, health and 
educational structures, and so on, in order to make them subject exclusively 
to its model, which is the ‘rationality’ of the market – which is in reality an 
irrational computational rationalization that eliminates everything 
incalculable, that is, every singularity. 
From the perspective of capitalism, only the market is rational, 
everything else is irrational, thus the market has all the rights: it can destroy 
everything, even the education of children. The market will educate children 
better than can their parents, their teachers or their pastors. 
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It is obviously through technology that this occurs: this ultra-
aggressive consumerism is perpetually undertaking research in order to 
appropriate the latest innovations. The development of technology demands 
that it be immediately placed into the service of these models of 
socialization, which are in fact models of de-socialization. 
For me, ultimately, the causes of all these catastrophes (the events of 
January 7, the far right in France becoming the majority, and so on) stem 
firstly from the fact that there is no public power capable of proposing a 
true socialization of these technological powers. We must place these 
powers back into the service, not of disindividuation and the destruction of 
individuals, but of reindividuation, re-idealization, the reconstitution of a 
political space and a solvent economy. 
One can always invoke historical, diplomatic, political and theological 
causes in order to explain these catastrophes. It is important to remember 
that not only the Koran but also the Bible contains many texts that are 
essentially about conquest, and therefore warlike, texts that have been the 
basis of the Crusades, the Inquisition and so on. But we should also 
remember that we have also seen the de-colonization of the British Empire, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the neo-colonization of the Middle 
East and the Near East by the United States. All the terrible, interconnected 
catastrophes involving Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and so on 
are tied to Western interventionist policies, whether these policies are 
English, American, French or all of them together, or those of the World 
Trade Organization, policies that have brought destruction to these 
societies. 
Take for example Iraq. The current crisis in Iraq was caused by Saudi 
Arabia and the United States in an absolutely deliberate way. The 
ambassador of the United States encouraged Saddam Hussein to attack 
Kuwait. His party, the Baath, was allied with the Soviet Union, India and the 
non-aligned countries. Even if there was not much to like about the Baath 
party, it had built a modern country, with schools, hospitals, a legal system, 
and it therefore contained sectarian Islam. 
All this is now in ruins and inhabited by a collective madness that we 
Westerners have caused. In Afghanistan, the United States supported 
Ahmad Shah Massoud against the Soviet Union, who was eventually 
sacrificed to the Wahhabites. All this is absolutely corrupt. The West has 
created this situation, and the despair that has been the result. It is a 
question, not of the ‘clash of civilizations’ referred to by Samuel Huntington 
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(1996), but of the criminal actions of the West in a civilization called Islam 
and that has led to madness throughout the whole region and not only in 
Islam: in Israel, too, some become mad – extremists, but also in the army, as 
Israeli soldiers say themselves. Unfortunately, in all this the West reaps what 
it has sown. 
All these facts, however, cannot absolve us from the need to confront 
the fact that we are not capable – we, the ‘intellectuals’, we, the people who 
claim to think – of using contemporary technology to produce models 
different from those developed by consumerism. And this is the first 
problem. If we were able to do so, all those kids who become suicidal, and 
who sometimes act out in Syria or elsewhere, would invest instead in new 
causes and would project new idealities. We have no causes to offer them. 
This is the problem, and it is our problem – it is our responsibility. 
 
 
Translated by Daniel Ross. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 ‘“Pansexuality” is not the assertion that sexuality is everything, or that everything can be 
explained in terms of sexuality and only by it; but it is the discovery that, in the 
exploration of the unconscious that is the specific domain of psychoanalysis, there is no 
path that does not constantly cross and intersect sexual representations. If it is not 
everything, sexuality is nevertheless present throughout the psychoanalytic field: it is 
coextensive with the unconscious.’ (Laplanche, 1997: 1). 
2 As Ian James suggests (2013: 308). 
3 Deleuze: ‘if we die of repetition we are also saved and healed by it’ (1994: 6), and ‘if 
repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it enchains and destroys us, it also frees us’ 
(19). 
4  Ars Industrialis is an international association of citizens working ‘for an industrial 
politics of technologies of spirit’; it was created on 18 June 2005 at the initiative of 
George Collins, Marc Crépon, Catherine Perret, and Bernard and Caroline Stiegler. 
Information: arsindustrialis.org/. 
5 The event was organized by Planète Emergences and Ars Industrialis in the framework of 
the festival, Marseille retrouve le nord. 
6 Marc Van Asch, mayor of Vilvoorde from 2007 to 2012. 
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